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DOC EN\RR\208537 - 2 - PE 152. 242/fin.At the sitting of 14 May 1990 the President of the European Parliament
announced that he had forwarded the motion for a resolution by Mr D. Martin
Mr De Gucht, Mr Herman Mr De Giovanni and Mr prag on the proposed pan-
European ' confederation ' and its implications for the institutions of the
European Community, pursuant to Rulue 63 of the Rules of procedure, to the
Committee on Institutional Affairs as the committee responsible and to the
Political Affairs Committee (now the Committee on Foreign Affairs and
Security) and the Committee on External Economic Relations for their opinions
(B3-0499/90) .
At its meeting of 18 December 1990 the
appointed Mr Hansch rapporteur.
Committee on Institutional Affairs
At its meeting of 24 April 1991 the committee decided to include in its report
the following motion for a resolution which had been referred to it:
B3- 1937/90; author: Mr Roumeliotis; subject: the new structures and
institutions of the CSCE; iinnounced in plenary sitting: 22 February 1991 
responsible: Committee on Institutional Affairs.
On a proposal from the rapporteur, the chairman of the committee invited in
writing both the committees asked for their opinions to extend their opinions
to cover the two motions for resolutions pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of
Procedure.
At its meetings of 29/30 January, 24 April , 18/19 September, 24 September
29 Odctober and 17 December 1991 and 22 January, 17 March, 22/23 April and
19/20 May 1992 the committee considereed the draft report.
At the last meeting it adopted the resolution by 16 votes to 6 with 4
abstentions.
The following took part in the vote: Oreja Aguirre, chairman; Prag, Bru Puron/
Melis, vice-chairmen; Hansch, rapporteur; Aglietta, Beiroco, Bindi (for
Colombo), Bossiere, Bourlanges, Capucho, Cassanmagnago Cerretti, Cheysson/ De
Giovanni, De Gucht, Duverger, herve (for Rothley), Lagakos, Liittge (for
David), Luster / Marinho, Martin, Musso, Perez Royo, Roumeliotis, Schodruch
(for Blot) and Woltjer (for Metten).
The opinion of the Committee on External Economic Relations is attached to
this report. The opinion of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security
will be published separately.
The report was tabled on 21 May 1992.
The deadline for tabling amendments will appear on the draft agenda for the
part-session at which the report is to be considered.
DOC EN\RR\208537 - 3 - PE 152.242/fin.MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION
on the structure and strategy for the European Union with regard to its
enlargement and the creation of a Europe-wide order
The European Parliament 
having regard to its resolutions on the political changes in Europe since
1989 and recent Europe-wide developments and to the constitution of the
European Union 
- hiiving regard to the motions for resolutions by Mr Martin and others
(B3-0499/90r and Mr Roumeliotis (B3- 193 7 /90) 
- having regard to the report by its Committee on Institutional Affairs and
the opinions of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and Security and the
Committee on External Economic Relations (Doc. A3- 0189/92) 
whereas the European Union has an increasing role and whereas increasing
demands are being made on it with regard to ensuring long-term domestic
and external peace among all the peoples of Europe  promoting democracy
and the rule of law in all parts of Europe  bringing about socially just
and regionally balanced advances in economic prosperity, securing
improved protection for the natural environment, and preserving and
fostering the cultural heritage throughout the whole of Europe,
1 in particular on:
political developments in Central and Eastern Europe including the Soviet
Unionl and the European Community role, 13 July  19901  A3-0712/90
(interim report by Mr Penders);
- the Helsinki II Conference, 9 October 1990, A3-0226/90 (Romeos report);
- the Intergovernmental Conferences in the context of Parliament' s strategy
for European Union, 22 November  19901  A3-0270/90 (interim report by
Mr Martin);
- the results of the Intergovernmental Conferences  7 April 1992, A3-0123/92
(Martin report);
- a general outline for association agreements with the countries of Central
and Eastern Europe  18 April 1991, A3-0055/91 (Randzio-Plath report);
- Community enlargement and relations with other European countries,
15 May  1991 A3-0077/91 (Planas report);
.. 
- the outlook for a European security policy,' 10 June  1991, A3-0107/91
(poettering report);
- and the other texts referred to in those resolutions. 2 On the constitutional basis of European Union, see the resolutions of
11 July 1990 and 12 December 1990, A3-0165/90 and A3-0301/90 (interim
reports by Mr Colombo)
DOC EN\RR\208537 - 4 - PE 152. 242/fin.whereas the progress of the Central and Eastern European states towards
political democracy and a market economy, the continuing policies of
reform in the republics on the territory of the former USSR/ and the end
of military and ideological confrontation in Europe have created a new
situation/ not least for the European Union and its relations with other
European states,
whereaS despite the removal of the Communist dictatorships and the
collapse of Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe/ the peaceful coexistence of
these peoples and progress towards the freedom of the individual
constitutional democracy and economic well-being is not secure on a long-
term basis,
whereas the integration of European states within the framework of the
European Union has proved itself to be a uniquely successful way of
overcoming nationalism/ bringing about peaceful settlements to disputes,
and promoting economic development and whereas it must therefore not be
abandoned under any circumstances, but rather consolidated and extended,
whereas for all European nations, economic, technological, ecological and
social development poses problems and threats with which the sovereign
national state alone is becoming less and less able to cope and which, as
well iiS progressive integration in the European Union, also require
increasingly intensive Europe-wide cooperation,
whereas the quality of being European is not clearly definable in
geographical or historical, ethnic or religious, or cultural or political
terms; whereas, however, it presupposes the political desire to share a
common future,
whereas the challenges posed, above all in securing peace, protecting the
environment/ promoting world-wide economic and social development and
ensuring respect for human rights, also imply a need for close cooperation
with non~European states, in particular the United States iind Canada,
Russia and other republics on the territory of the former Soviet Union and
with Turkey and the countries on the eastern and southern shores of the
Medi terranean
whereas the nations of Europe are also affected by the consequences of
social injustice, economic imbalance, growing ecological destruction .and
population growth in other parts of the planet; whereas they are
therefore compelled to increase their joint efforts in a worldwide
campaign against hunger, poverty, ecological destruction and
militarization
whereas various proposals have been put forward for developing the
structure of Europe, in particular the ' Charter for a New Europe ' signed
in the framework of the CSCE in Paris,
whereas Turkey, Austria, Cyprus, Malta; Sw~den and Finland have applied to
become members of the European Union, whereas ' Europe agreements ' have
been concluded with Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary which embody these
countries ' desire for membership and whereas other European states are
DOC EN\RR\208537 - 5 - PE 152.242/fin.also making appropriate moves and the countries bordering on the southern
and eastern Mediterranean have expressed the wish to strengthen their
links with the Union
whereas full membership of the Union implies, above all, a commitment to
the federal nature of that Union and that countries should be willing and
able to accept all its rules, if necessary after a suitable transitional
period/
whereas the enlargement of the European Union to include further states
will considerably disrupt the operation of its institutions, so that these
must be reorganized at the same time/
Essential features of a Europe-wide Order
states its conviction that the new situation in Europe confronts the
European Union with demands which it must meet on the home front by more
courageous reform in the direction of a union wi th a federal goal and on
the external front with a new iipproach to the issue of ever-closer
collaboration between all the nations of Europe;
Regards enlargement of the European Union to include those European states
which have fully developed democratic institutions under the rule of law
as well as guarantees for human rights and the structures of a miirket
economy / are willing and able to take over Community patrimony, including
economic and monetary union and unconditionally recognize the goal of
poli tical union, as desirable in the interest not only of those applying
for membership, but also of the European Union;
Does not believe that it is possible or desirable for all the nations of
Europe or those which feel themselves to be European or are .allied with
Europe to be gathered together at some future point into a union; points
out further that decisions on enlargements of the union also depend on the
future political , geopolitical and economic development in Europe and on
the internal development of the European Union;
Considers it desirable that, in the first instance/ accession negotiations
should commence with Austria, Sweden and Finland and should run in
parallel, with the aim of completing any accession by the same date;
Believes that the European Economic Area/ which should not reduce the
role of the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament/ will
both facilitate subsequent membership for those EFTA states desiring it,
as well as affording an opportunity for fostering close economic and
poli tical ties between the European Union and the economically advanced
European states that do not wish to join the Union;
Observes that the opportunities afforded under Article 238 of the EC
Treaty for closer ties with the Community and" for support for the reform
process in Eastern Europe have in no way been exploited to the full in the
association agreements (Europe agreements) concluded to date and suggests
in particular that:
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states may become involved as appropriate in foreign and security
policy cooperation as well as in cooperation in domestic policy and
law enforcement matters/ without, however, preventing the development
towards genuine, full-blown Community powers in those sectors;
forms of association should be able to be created affording gradual
but increasingly close involvement in the Community, with a view to
future membership;
multilateral forms of regional cooperation and regional political
dialogue between the Union and several associated states can be
developed in order to foster regional cohesion iind neighbourly
relations and combat the rise in nationalism;
Hopes, notwithstanding the likely enlargements to include, and
associations with, new partners that the European Union will, at all
events, continue its policy of opening up specific Community support
programmes such as SPES, SPRINT, ERASMUS or PETRA and agencies such as the
European Environment Agency to include all European states, acting
individually or in subregional groups, on the understanding that these
states should pay an appropriate share of the costs;
Calls on the Union/ alongside the strengthening and .democratization of its
own federal-type insti tutional system, to establish a system of
confederative cooperation in Europe, which could provide a Europe~wude
framework for resolving specific problems affecting Europe as a whole such
as, for exiimple, safeguarding security/ dealing with emigration and
immigration/ security of energy supply, dealing with certain tasks in
environmental protection, health protection, the fight against crime or
respect for human rights;
Considers that the Council of Europe and the CSCE should become part of
this ' system of confederative cooperation in Europe ' and should thus
continue and step up their important role as fora for Europe-wude
agreements in those areas for which they have particular responsibility
and that the European Union must be its centre and its driving force;
10. Considers it necessary that the European Union as such, in addition to its
Member States, should become a member of the Council of Europe and a
participant in the CSCE, with the Union gradually becoming the spokesman
for the Member States on those matters for which powers have been
transferred to it;
11. Believes that the system of confederative cooperation in Europe should
not be organized as a classic, unified and all-embracing confederation,
but rather that it should stem from a number of functionally or
regionally oriented confederations responsible for given sectors;
12. Considers it important that the cooperation in the functionally oriented
confederations should be organized flexJ.p.ly and that there should be
cooperation in them between the European Union and third countries which
are concerned for a joint solution to common problems in specific areas
and are willing where necessary to exercise jointly certain prerogatives
of national sovereignty;
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should not weaken or affect the process of integration in the European
Union, which is linked with the transfer of national responsibilities;
14. Believes that the USA and Canada, Russia and other states on the
territory of the former USSR, Turkey and the non-European Mediterranean
area should all be associated/ each in its own way, with the system of
confederative cooperation in certain areas of responsibility;
15. Believes that as a rule inter-governmental cooperationbetween the
European Union and the other States is currently the realistic and
appropriate means of taking political decisions in the system of
confederative cooperation in Europe, on condition however that the
participation of each state involved and above all of the European Union
is subject to parliamentiiryaccountability / that agreed law cannot become
operative in the European Union and in the other states until after it has
been approved by the European Parliament or the national parliaments;
16. Calls for the establishment of a ' European Academy 1 consisting of a
certain number of outstanding experienced and independent European
personalities drawn from the worlds of culture, art, science, religion and
politics, without regard to national quotas; they would act as
representati ves of Europe s cultural identity in .all its di versi ty;
II. structural and institutional reforms
The Union
17. Does not consider that the Treaty on European Union adopted on 7 February
1992 in Maastricht is sufficient to place the Union on the proper political and institutional footing required for it to respond
appropriately to the new challenges and in particular to welcome a number
of new Member States;
18. Is convinced that the European Union will not prove equal to the
accession of new Member states and the pan~European challenges unless it
(seven words deleted) grows into a Union founded on federal structures
with limited but real powers, applied on the basis of the subsidiarity
principle, and fully developed democratic institutions, based on a draft
constitution drawn up by the European Parliament for ratification by the
national parliaments;
19. Calls therefore for an intergovernmental conference to be convened before
1996 and before decisions are taken on any enlargement, and given a brief
to start this process with the involvement of the European Parliament, on
the basis of the draft Constitution of the union3 in such a way as to
ensure that the Union can absorb other European states whilst
strengthening its cohesion, its ability :\:o take decisions and its democratic legitimacy; .
3 Resolutions of 11 July 1990, A3-0165/90 and 12 December 1990 A3-0301/90/ on
the constitutional basis of European Union (interim reports by Mr Colombo)
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following lines:
that its institutions must be reformed along the
21. With regard to the Council:
the role and nature of the presidency must be redefined, taking into
account the principle of equality between the Member states and the
fact that a continuation of the present rotation will no longer be
practicable with an increasing number of Member states and in
particular the role of the Council presidency in representing the
European Union externally must be reduced;
its development into a second legislative chamber in the sense of a
genuine chamber of states and alongside the European Parliament must
be accelerated, with it becoming a standing body of the Union, its
meetings on legislative matters being held in public and taking
majority decisions with equal co-decision with the European
Parliiiment/ the qualified majority being redefined using new criteria
whilst maintaining weighted voting in respect of the enlargement of
the Union;
it must have a special role conferred on it in laying down
implementing provisions on the basis of the laws adopted by the
Council and Parliament in the framework of a clear legislative
hierarchy, as the responsibility of the Member states for the
implementation and application of Union laws must be maintained;
22.
23.
With regard to the Commission:
it must hold executive power in the European Union and as such must
manage the Union s affairs on the basis of the European Union s liiws
and in accordance with the guidelines laid down by the European
Council;
its political capacity to act and parliamentary accountability must be
strengthened, in particular with regard to responsibilities in
external relations iind in the system of confederative cooperation in
Europe;
it must represent the European Union at the external level in
particular to Europe-wude structures and in the areas of
responsibility transferred to its province and, in other areas, in
agreement with the Council and monitored by the European Parliament,
its monitoring powers being equivalent to those applying in foreign
policy in the Member states;
the principle of political portfolios must be introduced;
the Commission President, elected by Parliament on a proposal from the
European Council must, in agreement with the Council andthe
Parliament, decide on the composition of the Commission and the number
of its Members;
the use of deputy Commissioners for certain portfolios must be made
possible;
With regard to the European Parliament:
it must become more representative wit;.h. an increasing number of Member
states in the European Union in that the number of members shall be
laid down in accordance with the principle of ' degressi ve
proportionality , i.e. the higher the population of a given Member
state the lower their ratio to the population as a whole;
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equal rights and powers, in all spheres in which the European Union has legislative competence and with respect to all decisions
concerning revenue and expenditure (co-decision);
it must have considerably enhanced control over foreign and security
policy in particular with regard to the role of the European Union and
its decisions in the system of confederative cooperation in Europe and
the further development of the European Union in that it shall be
given the right of assent with respect to all fundamental common
foreign and security policy decisions, the conclusion of international
treaties and all decisions adopted unanimously by the European Union
Council of Ministers;
24. with regard to the use of languages in an enlarged European Union,
takes the basic position that:
respect for cultural diversity and legal security require that the
national languages in the European Union are official languages of the
European Union
every citizen and every Member of Parliament has the right to be heard
in his national language in the institutions of the Union and to be
informed in this language concerning Union policies and legislation
with the increase in the number of official languages in the European
Union agreement must be reached restricting the number of working
languages for internal use, in line with the varying requirements of
each institution;
Council of Europe
25. Suggests that it should be made possible for the Council of Europe to
extend still further its role in the field of cultural scientific, health, urban, private legal / social and social ethical cooperation
between all the states of Europe and organizations of states and proposes
that it should also play a greater role as a forum for dialogue between municipalities and the regions and between governmental and non-
governmental organizations in Europe;
26.  Advocates:
the further development of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the Social Charter, with a view to
developing a charter of minori ty rights in Europe which would
guarantee both individual and collective rights,
the completion of the system of legal protection under the European
Human Rights Convention, in particular in view of complaints about the
infringement of minority rights in European countries;
the drafting of further European conventions in fields of common
interest, particularly with regard to legal , socio-political , ethnic
and ethical questions;
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe ('~SCE
27. Believes that the recently enlarged CSCE must strengthen and
institutionalize its security policy activities in the field of
disarmament and arms control, confidence-building .measures and the
prevention of conflict;
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development of the CSCE Charter is particularly necessary in order to
harmonize the principle of non-interference and respect for territorial
integrity with the principle of respect for the right of autonomy and the
protection of minorities;
29. Views the participation of the USA and Canada within the CSCE not only as
an expression of the abiding involvement of these two states with the fate
of Europe but also as a possibility for further close cooperation over and
above the security sphere;
30. Wishes/ until such time that the European Community - or ultimately the
European Union - becomes a full participiint in the CSCE, to be
represented wi thin the CSCE parliamentary assembly by means of a
delegation enjoying a specifically-defined status;
WEU and NATO
31. Is of the opinion that the WEU/ which can serve in a transitional period
as iin instrument of common defence policy, must be linked more closely to
the Institutions of the European Union and should be absorbed into the
Union in 1996;
32. Takes the view that NATO, while the role of the CSCE is developing, and
while it undergoes its organizational reform and political and strategic
realignment on the basis of the Copenhagen and Rome Declarations, can
continue to act as a securi ty guarantee for the whole of Europe and
testify to the close bond between Europe on the one hand and the United
states and canada on the other;
33. Considers that the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council
provides a suitable starting point for increased security policy links
between NATO and the states of the former Warsaw Pact;
34. Considers it desirable for NATO to playa leading role in a comprehensive
non-aggression and mutual assistance pact binding all its member states
with all other European states including Russia and possibly other states
on the territory of the former Soviet Union and the European Union;
Requests to the institutions of the European Union
35. Confirms the mandate to its appropriate committee, quickly to complete the
drafting of the constitution for the European Union;
36. Calls on the Commission the Council and the Member states to develop the
European Union into the driving force and focal point of the system of
confederative cooperation in Europe and thus the fixed starting point for
a Europa-wide order to maintain peace across the continent, foster the
development of democracy, strengthen econQmic and social cohesion, protect
the natural foundations of human life, ,. to preserve the regions and
cultures of Europe in their diversity and also to meet its
responsibili ties for the fight against famine, poverty, environmental
degradation and rearmament also in other parts of the world;
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Commission, the Member states/ the USA and Canada, the Council of Europe,
the CSCE, the WEU and NATO.
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I. The European Communities were founded and consolidated at a time when
Europe was split into two spheres of influence separated by a rigid economic
and political divide and/ moreover, by ideological and military antagonism.
That fact has left its mark on the shape, aims, and actions of the
Communities over the entire course of their history to date.
Now, however, the Community is having to operate in a radically new context.
The Communist dictatorships in the east of the continent have collapsed. The
Soviet Union as such and its domination over Eastern Europe have crumbled
away. Democratic institutions under the rule of law and free markets are
coming into being everywhere in Eastern Europe. The unity of the German state
has been restored. Given the speed at which the politically divided, two-bloc
Europe met its demise and the ideological and military antagonism, to which
the Community waS likewise a party/ was brought to an end, it is natural that
the Communi ty ' structures, tasks, and actions do not yet match the new
condi tions in Europe.
Yes: the Community has demonstrated unity and made a judicious response to
the changes in Germany and Eastern Europe. It is organizing and, along with
its Member states, contributing 78% of the financial and economic aid for
Eastern and south-eastern European countries and the CIS. It has concluded
association agreements with the CSFR, Poland, and Hungary leading ultimately,
perhaps, to the accession of those countries. It will be opening
negotiations with a number of other Eastern European countries on association
or cooperation agreements. It has yet to unveil a blueprint for a new Pan-
European order and the role falling to the European Union in shaping that
order.
Yes: with the Maastricht Treaty on European Union, the Community has embarked
on a limited reform of its component bodies, given itself wider powers, and
opened up new fields of cooperation. By completing Monetary Union and
implementing the I Delors II'  package, it will be able to strengthen its
political, economic, and social cohesion. However, it has failed to produce
any ideas on its own future size and proper structure.
The Maastricht European Council noted that various European countries have
submitted applications for accession or declared their intention of joining
the Union, and instructed the Commission, in preparation for the Lisbon
European Council , to consider these matters, not least their implications for
the future development of the Union.
This report is Parliament I  contribution to the arduous, complex, and of
necessity controversial debate on the struct~r~ and strategy for the European
Union with regard to the creation of a Europe-wide order. At this initial
stage it shall confine itself to charting points of reference and guidelines
for the future development of the Union and its role in the new Europe.
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Union are based on the following three premisses:
1 . The form of integration whereby European countries have created the
European Communi ties has proved to be the only successful means of overcoming
nationalism, bringing about the peaceful / lasting settlement of disputes, and
promoting economic development in Europe. Over the past 40 years it has
fostered a close-knit network of economic, social , and political bonds and
channels of solidari ty among the Member States and their peoples. It has
become a stable and stabilizing factor not just for its Member states, but for
Europe as a whole.
In the event of a relapse into an order (or disorder) under the sway of
nation-states, Western Europe would lose its stability and the east be denied
stability. Under no circumstances, therefore/ must the Union be weakened or
even disbanded for the sake of enlargement or Europe-wide structures. It must
remain intact and ~ to that end - be deepened.
2. The new situation in Europe has created new problems or resurrected old
ones which have implications not only for individual states or the Union, but
for the continent as a whole. However , it does not just make common remedies
imperative, it also makes them possible. The Union, therefore, cannot shirk
the challenge of playing its part in creating and developing a new political
order for the whole of Europe.
3. In spite of economic crises, shaky democracy, and armed conflicts in
Eastern Europe and notwithstanding new uncertainties about the development of
the Community in Western Europe, the report is proceeding on the assumption
that, regardless of the continuing perils and inevitable reverses, human
rights / democracy, the rule of law, the market economy, and social justice
will, on the whole, flourish in Eastern and Central Europe and the CIS.
That being the case/ the Union, once it has completed the internal market and
ratified the Maastricht Treaty, will be called upon to accomplish three
stra tegic tasks:
It must strengthen its economic and social cohesion.
outside the scope of this report).
(That point lies
- It must be willing and able to enlarge its membership beyond the twelve
Member states.
It must be the heart and prime mover of a Pan-European order, in which peace
and security, democracy and the rule of law, social justice, free markets,
and environmental protection are fostered and supported in the whole of
Europe.
II. The historic successes of the Community, in particular completion of the
internal market, have increased its power of attraction over other European
countries. The end of the East-West antagonism in Europe has opened the way
for Europe s neutral countries to join the Community. The establishment of
the European Economic Area (EEA) has brought the EFTA countries economically,
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requires only an act of political will, without entailing a need for
significant structural changes to their economies and societies.
Membership applications from Turkey/ Austria, Cyprus, Malta, Sweden, and
Finland are currently on the table before the Community. Norway and
Switzerland are about to decide whether and, if so/ when they will apply to join. The Community association agreements with the CSFR/ Poland, and
Hungary lay down accession as the political goal to be pursued by those
countries. Other European states are likewis.e considering the possibility of
accession. When he made his first visit to the CommisSion in March 1992, the
Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozurev, said that Russia too wished one day
to join the Community.
With regard to the Turkish application, the Commission noted in its opinion of
18 December 1989 that accession was not a realistic option for the immediate
future. A favourable opinion has already been deli vered on the Austrian
application. Similar endorsements of the Swedish and Finnish applications are
likely to be given by the end of this year. The accession negotiations will
thus be able to begin as soon as the Community has concluded its discussions
on own resources and related issues, as it is due to do some time in 1992.
They could be completed wi thin two to three years.
There is no economic or political reason why the Union could, as a matter of
principle, deny membership to Austria, Sweden, or Finland and - should the
occasion arise - Norway or Switzerland. The Union is therefore likely to
comprise at least 15 Member States after 1995.
Enlargement of the Union is inevitable. It is not only in the interest of
potential applicant states, but also in the Union I s own interest. It is also
beyond question that the Union must remain intact and .a viable political force. This is not just in the interest of the current Member States. It
makes no sense for would-be applicants, in particular the CSFR, Poland, and
Hungary / to join a politically paralysed Community.
The Community as presently constituted or/ for that matter, as it will be
consti tuted after the Maastricht reforms, cannot encompass enlargement.
without further reform, i.e. deepening, enlargement to include 15 or more
Member States would sooner or later spell its destruction. The choice for the
Union is consequently not between ' widening or deepening , but rather between
enlargement or dissolution 
I .
There are no clear objective criteria for determining the optimum or maximum
size of the Union. No one can say how many Member States it can ' cope with'
without risking paralysis or regressing into a mere free trade area. It 
therefore impossible to lay down the number of Member States admitting of no
further enlargement of the Union. No one can gauge the maximum absorption
capacity which the Union could not exceed without bringing about its
destruction, but it is indisputable that a limit exists. Austrian accession
would certainly not impose a destructive strain on the Union, even as
pr.esently constituted, but it is equally certain that, however solid its
structures, the Union could not withstand the accession of all 38 other
European countries plus Russia.
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fact that new Member states would on principle be less willing than the old
ones to integrate, take decisions, or become part of a Community. It lies in
the rising number of states involved in decisions, since this will inevitably
complicate and prolong the procedures. It lies/ too, in the structure of the
Union decision-making machinery, which basically draws more heavily on
intergovernmental cooperation than on democratically ordered $upranationalism.
The more countries that join the Community and the smaller those countries,
the greater the degree of supranationalism and central authority that will be
required in order to preserve at least a modicum of unity and capacity for
action. The greater the degree of supranational ism and centralism required to
preserve the Union from dissolution, the more fundamentally limited the scope
will be for keeping alive national iind regional independence and enabling the
public to become broadly involved at every political level. The increasing
number of states in Europe poses more of an obstacle than not to their
incorporation into the Union.
Institutional reforms cannot and must not be taken so far that, to preserve
the viability of' the enlarged Union/ they destroy the basis on which
democratically ordered European states can form a voluntary association.
Deepening of the Union must therefore accord parliamentary bodies a
substantially greater say in decision-making iind make for rigorous observance
of the subsidiarity principle. The point at issue is not MPs ' hunger for
power and prestige or the retrogressive claims of national and regional
sovereignty: instead, the aim has to be to lay the essential foundations for a
wider Union encompassing more than twelve Member states.
Far-reaching principles of this importance should be laid down in a
constitution for the Union. Such a constitution is being drawn up in
Parliament' s Committee on Institutional Affairs. To assist in the drafting
process, this report is endeavouring to set out guidelines and principles to
help answer the institutional questions directly related to enlargement of the
Union.
Given that the Union has to expand, but must not disintegrate, given that its
structures have to be democratic and capable of action, but still preserve
independence at national and regional levels, both the conditions to be met by
applicant states and a blueprint for internal reform of the Union need to be
laid down and made binding on all.
Every new Member State must satisfy the conditions applied to previous
accessions: they must be geographically part of Europe/ be fully developed
democracies affording adequate protection for human and civil rights, have
free market economies, take over the whole body of existing Community law, i.e. including the future Monetary Union, and be willing to advance the
development of Political Union. Transitional periods for adopting the entire
acquis communautaire ' can be negotiated, the condition itself, however, must
be met at some stage.
The Union cannot ' negotiate itself back in time Membership will not be
available ' on special offer Part membership will likewise be out of the
question. Gi ven the degree of political , legal, institutional, and economic
integration achieved by the Union, it would raise insoluble institutional
poli tical, and psychological problems. It follows that the EFTA .countries are
the only feasible candidates for accession at present.
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end of 1992. They should be pursued in parallel to enable this group of
countries to join at the same time, since this would be desirable not only for
political, legal, and economic reasons and in view of the political climate in
the countries concerned, but also having regard to the future of the EEA.
Above all, it is necessary on account of the institutional reforms and
adjustments to be brought about in the Union. A ' cascade ' of accessions in
which every year (or even every six months) from 1995 onwards ratification
procedures would have to be completed, the structure and make-up of
Parliament, via the Council and Commission and extending down to individual
committees and working parties, would have to be adapted, entailing amendments
to procedural rulesl expansion of translation divisions, etc., would paralyse
the Union fora considerable length of time.
It is essential to deepen the structure of the Union to such an extent that
more than twelve Member States can belong to it. The point is not that it
should one day be able to absorb all European countries; however, the
institutional preconditions for accession of the countries which have
currently applied to join do not exist - even with the reforms provided for in
the Treaty on European Union. If it is to absorb just three more countries,
the Union needs to embark on a bolder reform of its institutions and decision-
making procedures.
Enlargement of the Union beyond the ranks of the EFTA countries should not,
for political and economic reasons, be addressed in the foreseeable future,
but given that the Union, through the Europe Agreements, has opened the way
for the CFSR, Poland, and Hungary to accede in the future, it follows that it
must so organize its component bodies and decision-making procedures so as to
make future accessions possible.
A Union which will one day comprise 15 or more Member states and at the same
time must remain able to act and fulfil its responsibility within the Pan-
European order needs to undertake the following institutional reforms as a
matter of urgency:
The Council
If the current rotating Council presidency is retained even with 15 Member
States, a national government will have to wait seven and a half years before
reassuming the presidency. During that time, especially if it is one of the
smaller governments, it will have inevitably lost the necessary expertise and
experience.
The Union will increasingly assert its identity through a common foreign
policy. As the number of Member States rises, so too will there be an
increasing number of governments with virtually no proven ongoing ties with
and experience in certain regions of the world, for instance the Middle East,
Africa, the Balkans, etc. Those will be the regions, however, which will
come to pose greater challenges for the - Union s common foreign and security
policy (CFSP). The new responsibility wtii'ch the Maastricht Treaty has
conferred on the Council presidency as regards implementing the CFSP will
bring this structural flaw more sharply to light. The joint ' troika ' system
will not be able to tackle the root of the problems.
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far as legislation is concerned. One detail will suffice to underline the
need for reforms: when the Council is discussing, for example, an important
matter of principle, such as the first stage of a legislative act, and 17
Member States and the Commission each make just a 10-minute introductory
statement setting out their positions, that procedure alone will account for
three hours ' debating time.
For both administrative/organizational and financial reasons it would be
undesirable to create a separate Council department responsible for planning
and implementing foreign policy. The Union would be unlikely to agree before
some considerable time to a system whereby the presidency would rotate among
the five large Member states only (with two newly created Council vice-
presidencies rotating among the remaining Member states) and its term of
office be increiised to a year. The necessary reforms of the structure and
working methods of the Council should therefore be modelled on the example of
the German Bundesrat. Us foreign policy powers should be limited to laying
down guidelines and decisions relating to principles. Responsibility for
planning and implementing the CSFP must be transferred to the Commission.
Domination of the large Member states has to date rightly been avoided by
means of weighting of votes in the Council.
The problem will no longer be posed in the same terms in an enlarged Union
since the only new members will be actually or relatively small countries.
Instead, it must be ensured in future that those countries ci3.nnot secure a
blocking minority with undue ease. The way to do so might be to alter the
respective weighting factors assigned to the votes of large and small Member
states and/or to redefine qualified majorities or blocking minorities. A new
weighting system would bring considerable political and psychological
problems  especially in the li3.rge Member states. This report shall
consequently go no further than proposing that ' majority' or ' blocking
minority ' be redefined.
- The Commission
If the five large Member states each appoint two Members and the others one
Member, the Commission will in future have 20 or more Members, by no means too
many for a government with executive powers. It remains to be seen, however,
whether Members of the Commission must continue to be appointed by and from
every Member state, since the Treaty prohibits them in any case from
representing national interests. At all events, as long as each Member state
has the right to appoint at least one Member, national balance in the
Commission will remain an open question.
The report will not go so far at this stage as to propose thi3.t Members of the
Commission should no longer be appointed by the Member Sti3.tes. Nevertheless,
it is seeking to break the link between the number of Members of the
Commission and the number of Member States. Instead, it is proposing that the
membership of the Commission should be the- subject of political agreement
among the Commission President designate, the Council, and Parliament and is
calling for Assistant Members of the Commission to be appointed to deal with
specific areas. Though limited, such a reform will obviously entail a
considerable change in the Commission I s internal organization, including:
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- an increase in the powers of the Commission President,
- clarification of the role and powers of Assistant Members of the Commission.
These reforms are essential to ensure that the Commission remains able to act.
On the other hand, they also pose a danger, namely that the centralized
European authority will grow to become the dominant force and the Member
states ' powers of decision will be undermined in areas where they can and
should enjoy policy-making freedom within the Union. Two steps must be taken
to counter it:
1. The Member States, through the Council  on the basis of and in accordance
with the laws adopted by the Council and Parliament, must have special
influence as regards conferring executive powers, thereby enabling them to
discharge their responsibility for enacting and enforcing Union laws.
2. Parliamentary influence over the membership of the Commission and
supervision of its regular political and administrative activity must be
strengthened beyond the degree decided upon at Maastricht. This applies
particularly in the case of the CSFP, regarding which the Commission has been
given a right of initiative and is to be given still greater executive powers
in the future.
Parliament
In a Union that has been enlarged to include 15 or more Member states and is
faced with the additional tasks resulting from the Maastricht Treaty, normal
legislation certainly cannot remain the resul t of cooperation between
government bureaucracies. The current tendency to deparliamentarize the
law-making process in the democracies of Western Europe, which the Maastricht
Treaty did not do enough to remedy, would only be further intensified by the
accession of even more states. This trend is no longer tolerable.
If democracy and parliamentarism are to be preserved, politics and legislation
must either be renationalized under the enlarged Union or the European
Parliament must have the same rights and powers as the Council of Ministers to
make decisions in all areas of legislation and to participate in all decisions
to do with revenue and expenditure. In addition, it must also be given the
right to approve all fundamental foreign and security policy decisions, the
conclusion .of international treaties and all decisions tiiken unanimously by
the Council of Ministers wi thin the framework of European Union.
Even as things stand today, the role of Parliament in the law-making process
of the Union raises the question of its representative nature. The question
will become even more acute once its rights have been strengthened and the
Union has been enlarged. Even today 54 million people in the seven small and
medium-sized Member states are represent~d by 134 Members, while 290 million
people in the five large Member states are re~resented by a mere 384 Members.
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twice the weight than that of an Italianl British or French voter (not to
mention the special cases of Luxembourg  which is grossly over-represented, or
Germany  which is under-represented). If the current system is retained in an
enlarged Union  the over-representation of the smaller Member states will be
accentuated even further.
As long as a Union constitution does not confer the same voting rights on all
citizens of the Union, the influence of the smaller Member states will
continue to be safeguarded by a disproportionately large number of Members in Parliament or votes in the Council under an enlarged Union. But
Parliament  at least, must not allow the mismatch between population and
parliamentary representation to become too great.
The report proceeds on the assumption that proportionality of representation
in Parliament is now unattainable and  in view of the continuing inadequiicy of
Parliament' s powers there is not yet any need to achieve it. Nevertheless l
deems it essential to draw closer to fairer representation of the people of
the Member States. The details relating to this point will be set out in a
special report by .the Committee on Institutional Affairs.
The use of the lanquaqes
In a multilingual Union, the use of languages in its institutions already
poses a special problem, whose political, economic and psychological
implications should not be underrated. It is quite obvious that this problem
will increase with enlargement. Every Member state will (have to) insist that
its official language is also ,made an official language of the Union. The
accession of Sweden, Finland and, possibly  Norway will increase the number of
official languages in the Union from 9 to 11 or 12. (Austria and Switzerland
do not present any additional problems in this regard, and nor do Cyprus and
Malta " .
Currently some 10 000 meetings of Community bodies are interpreted into the
nine official languages every year. Nine languages result in 72 combinations
for interpreting purposes. This requires 27 interpreters for every single
meeting. Thirteen languages would result in 156 possible combinations,
necessitating the use of 42 interpreters per meeting. Sixteen languages would
result in 240 possible combinations, which would require 54 interpreters for
one meeting of a single committee. With the best will in the world it would
no longer be possible to organize the use of all the official languages of an
enlarged Union as full working languages, assuming that there is the will to
bear the expenditure this entails.
The enlarged Union will directly affect, through its policies, the fates of
more than 350 million people. Its policies and laws must be concrete and
understandable. Legal certainty, as well as democratic participation and
monitoring, require that the official language of each Member State should
also be an official language of the Union. Each citizen and each directly
elected Member must be entitled to be heard in the language of his/her
country.
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is concerned, new and more flexible solutions will have to be found. This
does not necessiirily mean reaching agreement on the use of certain working
languages across the institutions (nor is it probably opportune to do so).
Rather, we must seek to secure acceptance of the principle that the number of
working languages in official use may be restricted.
The rules governing the number and use of such languages may vary from
institution to .institution. The Commission, for example, might decide on one
or two, the Council on three or four and Parliament on four or more working
languages. Different rules governing the active and passive use of
interpreting etc. are also feasible.
The report does not set out a comprehensive list of all the necessary
adjustments and it certainly does not contain all the demands which
Parliament will have to make in respect of the Union s future development. It
merely proposes such reforms as will be absolutely necessary in conjunction
with the next enlargement. Before any new countries join, that is before the
Intergovernmental Conference scheduled for 1996, these reforms must be given
treaty form. In deciding whether or not to give its assent to the accession
laid down in Article 0 of the Treaty on Union, Parliament will certainly have
to take these facts into account.
III. The impending enlargement to 15 or more Member states will enable the
Union to expand and consolidate the basis of its economic and social cohesion
and thus better equip it to meet its responsibilities throughout Europe. The
new political and economic situation in Europe, as well as general economic,
scientif ic, technological, environment and social developments, confront not
only the Union but all European nations with new problems and dangers, which
they will no longer be able to tackle effectively with the traditional
national instruments and claims to sovereignty. They will either overcome
these problems together - or they will succumb to them together.
1. Freedom and democracy, the rule of law, protection of minorities, economic
development and social justice are the foundations of internal and external
peace-keeping throughout Europe. Therefore it is no longer a purely domestic
matter to ensure that they are guaranteed. The CSCE Moscow declaration of
September 1991 states that respect for human rights  basic freedoms,
democracy and the rule of law can no longer remain an internal matter of
exclusive concern to a particular state but has become a matter of concern to
all the signatories.
2. In eastern and south-eastern Europe, ethnic, religious, political,
economic and social conflicts have been revived or have flared up once again.
They have already led to armed clashes. Now that the I disciplining ' effect
of the bloc structures and military confrontation has gone, local and regional
armed conflicts have once again become possible in Europe. It is therefore
vital that all European nations join a system of conflict settlement and agree
to accept the mediation of common inE1ti tutions. To this end, they must
renounce traditional claims to non-interferertce in their internal affairs and
also adopt common institutions and procedures for conflict avoidance and
resolution, equipping them with the necessary decision-making and executive
powers.
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environmental and social consequences entail the same new cross-border risks
for all the European nations. This applies, for example, to the use of
nuclear power, the development of genetic engineering or the introduction of
new materials and technological procedures. It also applies to the collapse
of entire ecological systems  due to human intervention in nature. The new
technologies also create opportunities for people to draw closer together, to
help each other and understand each other. This is just as true of the
construction of a transcontinental transport infrastructure as it is of energy
production and supply or telecommunications. Just as the problems which they
create are common to all the European nations, the solutions being sought to
these problems must be joint solutions.
4. It was necessary to open up the borders in Europe and give people greater
mobili ty. These are steps which promote progress and ensure peace. But they
also entail risks, for example, the spread of disease and drug addiction and
the increase in drug-related crime and terrorism. Increased freedom of
movement in Europe must therefore go hand in hand with increased cooperation
in the fight against disease and crime.
5. The cultural richness and identity of the European nations have always
been based on the diversity of niitional and regional characteristics and on an
intensive exchange between them. It therefore remains vital that the
increasingly close cooperation between the European nations also serves to
preserve and develop the common European historical , cultural and political heritage. Through its own structure, the Union must help to ensure that
national , regional and local independence is not merely tolerated but
protected and promoted within the context of the greater whole.
6. In the past, movements of population for economic, political, ethnic or
religious reasons have greatly contributed to the diversity of European
culture and its historical achievements. In the future, too, migrations may
stimulate the cultural, economic and political development of Europe.
However, mass internal European movements of refugees from east to west, or
immigration from the southern Mediterranean region may lead to strains which
the host countries may deem intolerable. In fact, they also have the
destabilizing effect of impoverishing the countries of emigration in terms of
human resources. The problems connected with this can only be overcome in
collaboration. A policy that does not involve the countries in which these
migrations have their origins will necessarily result in the isolation of the
Union. This would have disastrous consequences. Europe would be forfeiting its internal liberality, placing its security at risk and abdicating its
geopolitical responsibility.
7. By virtue of their history, economic strength and environmental
interests, all the European nations bear a large measure of responsibility for
global development, particularly for respect for human rights, the
strengthening of democracy, the creation of prosperity and social justice, and
the preservation and restoration of the natural bases of life on earth. The
United Nations I Human Development Report of 1992' established that the income
of the richest fifth of the world' s population, to which the Union belongs, is
60 times as great as that of the poorest fifth, including the majority of the
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population produce 80% of the world' s GNP and control 80% of world trade,
financial flows and reserves. Efforts to establish a Europe-wide order do not, therefore, relieve the European nations of their duty to make an
appropriate joint .contribution to the survival of mankind.
These problems force the nations of Europe to engage in cooperation which
cannot be confined within the framework of the European Union, even if it is
enlarged to include 15 or more Member States. The solutions require Europe-
wide cooperation. Indeed it may even be necessary to .go beyond the
continent' boundaries. There is therefore a need for well-organized
cooperation, for example, with Russia and the other countries of the former
Soviet Union  the United states and Canada as well as the countries along the
southern and ea.stern shores of the Mediterranean. These Europe-wude
structures must be less integrationist  less supranational and more flexible
than the Community s, and must also extend beyond the frontiers of the
continent.
For the Union, this entails commitments to consolidate its own structures.
But it must also assume joint responsibility for developments in other parts
of the continent. It cannot meet these responsibi 1 i ties through the provision
of financial  economic and humanitarian aid alone. It must endeavour to meet
them institutionally by offering cooperation and involving the countries
concerned more closely in a Europe-wide order.
IV. The Union will enlarge but it will never comprise all the European
countries. It will never be synonymous with 'Europe . Nor is this necessary.
There are no clear criteria governing membership of Europe. Europe as a
geographical concept is different from Europe as a political concept or .
cultural , historical or economic concepts. At any rate, the movement towards
democracy and the market economy in a string of Eastern European countries is
now quite irreversible.
Against this background, the Union must beware of entering a cul-de-sac at the
end of which the European countries will be faced with the stark choice
between accession and exclusion. European countries (and countries which feel
European) that cannot become members of the European Union  or do not wish to
join, must not be excluded from European cooperation. The Union must offer
these countries new forms of cooperation outside the Member States.
In any event, the search for a solution to the specific problems of modern
industrial societies calls for close cooperation with non-European countries.
The issues involved cannot be solved by enlarging the Union. It is necessary
to establish structured cooperation with Russia and the other republics of the
CIS, Turkey and the countries to the south and east of the Mediterranean and,
above all , the United States and Canada.
A Europe-wide- order does not need to be created from nothing. It can build on
existing organizations. Alongside the Un~on itself, there are the Council of
Europe and the CSCE. Their possibilities and' limitations must be reassessed
and the part they are to play in the new European order must be determined
anew. In addition, there are already a large number of other Europe-wide
organizations. A number of European countries should first ensure that they
are in a position to take full advantage of these organizations.
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association with the Community: free trade associations (with Malta and
Cyprus), development associations (with the ACP countries), cooperation
associations (the ' Europe Agreements ' with Czechoslovakia, Poland and
Hungary) and accession associations (with Turkey and with Greece prior to
1981 ) . Thus the scope offered under Article 238 of the EEC Treaty is far from
being exhausted either with regard to the form or the content of associations. It poses no obstacles whatsoever to more far~reaching forms of legal 
economic, political and institutional links between the Community and third
countries.
FOr the future  two types may be particularly relevant to the Union
Pan-Europeiin role:
1 . Association.on the lines of the European Economic Area miiy be appropriate
for those European countries that, in order to protect their freedom of
movement in foreign policy, monetary policy and legislation, do not wish to
join the Union but want access to the EC I S internal market.
2. Association with the European Union. Under the Maastricht Treaty it is
possible to accede to the Union (Article 0) but association is only possible
with the Community (Article 238). The Treaty should be altered at the
earliest opportunity so as to make association with the Union possible. It
would be an avenue open to those European countries that are unwilling or
unable to become members in the medium term owing to their state of
development but want to be associated with the Union s foreign and security
policy and/or cooperation in domestic policy and legal matters.
Clearly, these new forms of association must be tailored to suit certain
European countries and restricted to them. If the Union wishes to meet its
obligations  both internal and external  in the years to come, it cannot
afford to offer membership as generously as the CSCE does at present, nor be
so generous with association agreements as the Council of Europe is planning
to be in future.
In any event - future associations apart - the Union should continue its
policy of opening specific research programmes such as SPES, SPRINT, ERASMUS
and PETRA and agencies such as the European Environment Agency to all
European countries that are interested and prepared to assume an appropriate
share of the cost.
Various proposals have been made for a European Confederation ora I European-
Atlantic Community from Vancouver to Vladivostok' . A large-scale organization,
based on international law, embracing all the European states and those that
are associated with Europe s vital interests, would severely tax the will to
cooperate, the solidarity and the ability to construct democratic and
efficient organizational structures of the countries involved. Cooperation
and the integration of interests in Europe must be swiftly, efficiently,
pragmatically and flexibly organized. The Union should therefore develop a
system of confederal cooperation in Europe' rather than a comprehensive
Pan-European confederation.
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Rather  it should be a Union of organizationally independent functional
task-oriented confederations , that is, a nUmber of iid hoc associations for
close, formalized cooperation in tackling tasks recognized as common tasks,
within specific Pan-European problem areas. The resulting cooperation would
be termed I confederal  because it would be long-term in nature and
institutionalized and because, as far as necessary  it would go hand in hand
with the joint exercise of sovereignty by its members. They would .create
closer links between participants than is the case with cooperation in other
international organizations, and, at the same time, permit a Europeiin
geometrie variable ' that was not detrimental to the cohesion of the Union.
Both existing and newly formed organizations can be turned into  task-oriented
confederations ' They can be tailored to specific political areas, such as
large-scalel cross-border environmental protection and/or cooperation in
specific areas of research and development  and make use of existing
instruments such as EUREKA, COST, ESA or the IAEO and the future Environment
Agency to this end. The European Conference of Transport Ministers could be
expanded and the European Energy Charter could be further developed. But
task-oriented confederations may also be of a regional character, similar to
the Baltic Councilor the Alpine Convention. The system must remain flexible
and it must be possible jointly to tackle new tasks at any time.
In any event  all participants in the ' system of confederal cooperation in
Europe ' must be prepared to subscribe to basic values and aims, drawn up and
guaranteed by the CSCE. The Union should be involved in every task-oriented
confederation. On the one hand, it is not necessary for all European
countries to participate in a particular task-oriented confederation; this
would not damage its Europe-wide identity or have any adverse effects on
Europe-wide cohesion. On the other hand, non-European countries could also
participate. This would make it possible to find the appropriate framework,
compatible with the I geography of the problem , where cross-border problems
are concerned.
Two organizations will assume special importance within the system of
confederal cooperation in Europe: the Council .of Europe and the CSCE. When
its role in certain areas of Europe-wide policy is consolidated and clarified,
the Union, with its increased powers under the Maastricht Treaty, must become
a member or participant in its own right alongside its Member States.
Since 1989 the Council of Europe has been extended from 23 to 27 Member States
through the admission of Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland and Bulgaria. Eight
countries of eastern and south-eastern Europe - Russia (as the successor of the former Soviet Union), Romania, Slovenia, Albania, Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Croatia - have now been accorded special guest status, which
was deliberately set up as an ' antechamber ' for subsequent membership. Some
time in the future, the Council of Europe is anticipating applications from
the nine sovereign states that came into being as a consequence of the
disintegration of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. In a few years, therefore,
the Council of Europe may comprise 42 Europeartcountries.
In the 40 years or more it has been in existence, the Council of Europe has
made a tremendous contribution to the development of a humane Europe,
increasingly united in its shared basic values, with more than 140 conventions
and international agreements in the areas of human rights and fundamental
freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), education (e. g. the European
DOC EN\RR\208537 - 25 - PE 152.242/fin.Convention on Culture), science, public health (e.
g. 
the European
Pharmacopoeia), conservation and environmental protectionl and European legal
and constitutional matters. It provides the framework for a network of more
than 30 000 bilateral treaties between its .Member states, reflecting a
consensus in political , social and legal issues which is often regarded as
axiomatic.
The Council of Europe should continue this key task and concentrate its work
on the development and exercise of parliamentary democracy, respect for human
and basic rights, recognition of the rule of law in its member states and in
their relations with each other and the commitment to settle conflicts by
peaceful means  including international legal procedure. In doing so, it is
important for it to obtain broad support through close cooperation with
regions, local authorities and non-governmental organizations.
In conjunction with the strengthening of the legal instruments available to
the Council of Europe and the protective system of the European Convention on
Human Rights, the question of national minorities will assume particular
importance. This applies to the protection of the rights of those national
minorities that do not feel an affinity with any other people. It also
applies to the recognition of the multifarious cross-border relations between
members of national minorities and citizens of other countries, with whom they
are related by common ethnical national origins. To this end, the Convention
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the European Social Charter could
evolve into a Charter of the Rights of Minorities in Europe, guaranteeing both
individual and collective rights.
Since the signing of the Paris Charter in November 1990, all the republics of
the former Soviet Union have been members of the CSCE. It thus spans the
whole of the Atlantic-European-Asian area from Vancouver to Vladivostok. 
is doubtful whether, with 52 Member States and such a broad geographical
span, it will remain capable of taking swift decisions and acting decisively.
The Atlantic Alliance, and the military integration of NATO in particular,
therefore remain the single most important element in European security.
Nevertheless, attempts should be made to turn the CSCE into a Pan-European
organization, whose main role is to discuss and take decisions on preventive
securi ty policy in Europe on all points relating to the modern, integral
concept of security. This includes agreements and the implementation of
confidence-boosting measures, disarmament, arms control and conflict
prevention. The CSCE framework should also be used to guarantee minority
rights, and to conclude agreements to eliminate the causes of the growing
population movements. The CSCE should also be able to make a vital
contribution to the conclusion of a comprehensive non-aggression pact between
all its participants. In the longer term, NATO and/or a WEU integrated into
the EC could also assume some of the duties arising from the implementation
and guaranteeing of the decisions taken by the CSCE.
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breather life into those set up under the Paris Chiirter. The sole exception to
this might be the appointment of a High CommiSsioner for migration iind refugee
questions in Europe, as already contemplated. With regard to the
implementation of its decisions  the CSCE should recommend other organizations
and the new task-oriented confederations to incorporate CSCE conclusions in
their progriimmes of work.
The ' system of confederal cooperation in Europe ' can and must iilso promote
regional cooperation between different states to provide a counterweight to
fragmentation into increasingly small national and autonomous units.
The Europe-wide order outlined in this report would not be based on
concentric circles' or ' different speeds ' .. It would resemble a daisy with
the Union forming the central diSc and the Council of Europe, the  CSCEI  the
Atlantic Alliance, the various tiisk-oriented confederations and the Union
associate states, forming petals of differing length.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B3-0499/90
tabled pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure
by the members D. MARTIN, DE GUCHT, HERMAN, DE GIOVANNI and PRAG
on the proposed pan-European "confederation" and its implications for the insti tutions of the European Community
The European Parliament 
Having regard to the recent momentous events in Central and Eastern Europe;
- Having regard
Confederation;
President Mitterand' proposal for Pan-European
- Having regard to the aspirations both of Central and ERas tern European
countries and of EFTA countries for a closer association with the Community,
ranging from requests for closer trading arrangements to potential requests
for full membership;
- Having regard to the benefits in terms of peace and stability that can be
provided by binding and permanent frameworks for cooperation and by
economic and political integration;
Considers that the Community must explore the possibilities for a form of
closer association with the Community than those currently in force
pursuant to Article 238 of the Treaty,
Considers that any expansion of Community membership will require a
restructuring of the institutions fo the Community and the strengthening
of their decision taking capacity,
Considers that the concept of a "two-tier Community" may have to be e
xamined closely as a potential transitional solution to the aspirations
for membership of new countries,
Calls upon the Commission, after consulting the presidency of European
political cooperation to present a full and comprehensive report to
Parliament of how it envisages future Pan-European cooperation and integtration, and in particular the institutional framework in which this
would take place.
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MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION B3-1937/90
pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Procedure
by Mr ROUMELIOTIS
on the new structures and institutions of the CSCE
The European Parliament 
having regard to the Paris Charter for a New Europe, which was adopted at
the CSCE Summit of 21 November 1990, and in particular the arrangements for setting up a parliamentary assembly, meetings of the Council of
Foreign Ministers, a Secretariat, etc.,
whereas the pursuit of a common foreign and security policy is
inconceivable unless the Community speaks with a single voice in
international organizations and hence in the  CSCE as the European
parliament has repeatedly urged (see the MARTIN and COLOMBO reports),
Considers that the Commission and the Council should represent the
Community in this new forum and that the European parliament' s roile
should consist in exercising political supervision and forging links with
the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly;
Calls on the Commission to look into ways and means of ensuring Community
participation in these new forums.
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(Rule 120 of the Rules of Procedure)
of the Committee on External Economic Relations
for the Committee on Institutional Affairs
Draftsman: MrJan SONNEVELD
At its meeting of 17 July 1990 the Committee on External Economic Relations
appointed Mr Sonneveld draftsman.
It considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 28 February, 23 March and
23 April 1992.
At the last meeting it unanimously adopted the conclusions.
The following took part in the vote: De Clercq, chairman; Stavrou and Junker
vice-chairmen; Sonneveld, draftsman; Chabert, Ib Christensen, Guillaume, Janssen van Raay (for Lemmer), Miranda de Lage, Moorhouse, Peijs,
Suarez Gonzales and Visser (for Sainjon).
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1. The Hansch report being drawn up by the Committee on Institutional Affairs
is the first stage in an in-depth discussion of the implications of the
collapse of the Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the ensuing
disappearance of the ideological confrontation between East and West.
2. The Hansch report rightly points out that this situation creates
challenges for the Community to which it must find an adequate response:
(a) internally, by reforming itself into a real Union;
(b) creating closer linkS between the Community and the European states
associated with it and with the Union;
(c) vis-a.-vis the outside world, by developing a new concept of a ' system for
confederative cooperation in Europe ' in which other countries .could also participate (the United states, Canada, the former Soviet Republics
including the Russian Federation, Turkey and the non-European countries on
the shores of the Medi terranean) .
3.. According to the rapporteur, the system of confederative cooperation in
Europe should be based on existing European organizations, such as the Union,
the Council of Europe and the CSCE. The system would take the form of a
number of confederations responsible for particular sectors and for seeking
joint solutions to problems on a European scale .such as energy supplies,
environmental protection, health care and combating crime, with the Community
acting as the central driving force.
4. With a view to a more effective approach to the vast task facing the
Community, the rapporteur puts forward a number of proposals  some more far-
reaching than others, concerning the structure of the Community; these
proposals have already given rise to some controversy in the committee
responsible. In particular, the suggestion that the Presidency of the
European Council and the Council of Ministers should change annually under a
system of rotation involving the five larger Member states has met with
understandable resistance. Similarly, we have not yet heard the last word on
a proposal to introduce a limited number of working languages. The Committee
on Institutional Affairs has also questioned the rapporteur proposals
regarding the role of the other institutions and the Council in particular.
5. Finally, the rapporteur suggests that a further intergovernmental
conference should be convened before 1996 to build upon the Union Treaty of
10 December 1991 in such a way as to ensure that the Community can absorb
other European states without surrendering its cohesion, its ability to take
decisions, and its democratic legitimacy.
Observations
6. The discussion of a Pan-European order is undoubtedly a useful exercise
and one that should be taken seriously. It is regrettable therefore that the
discussion is currently being conducted on two fronts, namely the Pan-European
order as such on the one hand and, on the other, fairly detailed proposals on
institutional reform. This approach may result in attention being distracted
from the main topic - the Pan-European order - (as has clearly been the case
with the discussion on the Hansch report so far).
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provisional conclusions on the Pan-European order (with the Hansch report
becoming an interim report), which could then have been expanded at a later
stage. The question of institutional reform would then not have been on the
agenda until the second stage. There is in fact no hurry about discussing
this aspect since the rapporteur wants the intergovernmental conference to be
convened by the end of 1995 at the latest.
However, since the rapporteur has raised these institutional issues,
committee will also have to state its position on them.
our
8. The rapporteur s proposal that the Presidency of the European Council and
the Council of Ministers should change each year under a system of rotation
involving the five larger Member states is not, in our view, well-founded. If
we understand the situation correctly, during the debate in the Committee on
Institutional Affairs Mr Hansch questioned whether the administration of a
small' country would be capable of assuming the Presidency in the future
(widening and deepening). We would dispute this assumption. No evidence can
be found in the history of the Community that the larger countries have
fulfilled the Presidency more successfully than their smaller partners.
Indeed congratulations are due here to Luxembourg and Ireland (far from being
the largest Community Member stat.es) who have always provided an effective
Presidency.
During 1991 the filetherlands Presidency came in for a great deal of criticism
over the issue of Yugoslavia. Some of this criticism may have been justified
but it is debatable whether one of the larger - and in this area more
commi tted - Member states would have been more successful. Indeed, the
differences of view with other larger Member States might well have been more
marked.
The most important objection to this proposal from Mr Hansch is that it is
incompatible with the democratic nature of the Community.
9. This said  we readily recognize that the present organization of the
Presidency has a number of drawbacks.
One of these is the strict alphabetical order in which the Presidency rotates.
We support the rapporteur s proposal that the Presidency of the Council should
henceforth consist of three Member States: a President and two Vice-
Presidents, but on the understanding that wi thin this 1 troika ' there should
always be a balance between the larger and smaller Member States and between
the northern and southern Member States. It would also be desirable for each
member of the troika, the President and the two Vice-Presidents, to be given
specific portfolios to make the Presidency more effective and more
professional in its approach.
10. We would also support the rapporteur s proposal that if there is an
increase in the number of official languages, agreement should be reached on a
limited number of working languages. The question which immediately arises
here is for which activities the official languages should be used and when
the working languages should be used. First of all agreement would, of
course, have to be reached on how many and which working languages would be
adopted.
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by Mr Hansch. We realize that these do not fall directly within the terms of
reference of the Committee on External Economic Relations but they do affect
all the committees indirectly.
In this context, we should like to put forward a further suggestion for
consideration by the Commission and Parliament: would it not be a good idea,
with .a view to improving cooperation between the two institutions, for the
responsibili ties of the Members of the Commission and those of the
parliamentary committees to be aligned? Each parliamentary committee would
thus have a counterpart in the Commission and vice versa. The Members of the
Commission would then not have to appear before a number of bodies (leaving
aside those depending on political .groups) to say the same thing. Similarly,
parliamentary committees would be able to concentrate on the activities for
which one Commissioner is responsible. This suggestion could be taken into
account at the next European Parliament elections and when the new Commission
is appointed.
12. It is also assumed that before a decision is taken on any further
enlargement of the Community, the number of Commissioners will be restricted
to the number of policy sectors for which Parliament has set up committees.
This would not of course rule out deputy Commissioners being appointed for
smaller areaS of policy.
On the Pan-European order as such, the following observations should be made.
13. First .of all, the applications for accession to the Community from the
countries eligible for membership should be met as soon as possible. This
applies in particular to the relevant EFTA countries (Austria, Sweden and
Finland). The EEA should primarily be seen as a transitional phase preceding
full membership. It is inconceivable that the other EFTA countries (with the
possible exception of Iceland) will accept the EEA as a permanent framework
for cooperation, in that they share virtually all the rights and obligations
of the Community but ultimately have no say in internal decision-makin.g. The
accession of these countries is not likely to have an adverse effect on the
decision-making process and they .should ultimately subscribe to all the
existing rules.
14. Secondly, in our view, the Central and Eastern European countries
associated with the Community, so far Hungary  Poland and Czechoslovakia,
should have the closest possible links with the Community. There are social
psychological and cultural arguments to support this view. However, it is
iilso important to ensure that these countries do not find themselves in a
political vacuum, particularly in view of the still uncertain situation in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (the former Soviet Republics). We would
therefore support paragraph 5 of the motion for a resolution.
15. Finally, we would question paragraph 10 of the motion for a resolution.
Why should a number of non-European countrie!;!, (the United States and Canada) be mentioned by name and others (Japan and Australia) not? In this
technological age we cannot imagine that the rapporteur was influenced by
their distance from Europe.
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The Committee on External Economic Relations:
(a) suggests that the Hansch report should be an interim report so that its
conclusions can be expanded upon at a later stage; it should include only
those matters which relate to improving the way in which the Community
operates with a view to the inevitable increase in the number of Member
states in the near future;
(b) supports the proposal to introduce a ' system of confederative cooperation
in Europe I in the form of functionally oriented confederations responsible
for certain sectors and for finding solutions to specific problems on a
European  scalel  with the Community providing a central focus and momentum;
(c) considers thiit many non-European countries with a democratic structure
should also be involved in the system of confederative cooperation in
Europe to achieve iimore coherent representation of interests worldwide;
(d) recognizes that the Community will have to take a number of decisions
concerning its internal structure if it is to achieve a more effective
approach to the vast problems it will be facing;
(e) rejects the proposal that the Presidency of the European Council and the
Council of Ministers should change each year under a system of rotation
involving the five larger Member states since it is incompatible with the
democratic nature of the Community;
(f) supports the idea of further development of the Troika system for the
Presidency of the Council. The three Member States which form the Troika
perform the duties of the President and Vice-Presidents respectively. As
the Troika system is developedl care must be taken to ensure that:
(i) there is a balance between larger and smaller Member states and
between the more northern and more southern Member states;
(ii) a rational distribution of tasks between President and Vice-
Presidents is achieved in order to increase the professionalism of
the Presidency;
(g) advocates that at the next enlargement of the Community a limited number
of working languages should be introduced;
(h) considers that the responsibilities of the Members of the Commission 
the one hand and of the parliamentary committees on the other should be
more closely aligned and that efforts should be made by both sides to work
with a single counterpart;
(i) proposes that at the next accession the number of members of the
Commission should be restricted to the number 'of relevant areas of policy
- with only one Commissioner responsible for external economic relations- but does not rule out the possibility of appointing ' deputy
Commissioners ' for subsiding areas of policy;
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countries (Austria, Sweden and soon Finland) will start as soon as
possible and regards the EEA primarily as a transitional phase preceding
full membership;
(k) considers that the Central and Eastern European countries associated with
the Community (shortly Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia) should be
anchored to the Community as firmly as possible to avoid the risk of a
political vacuum in these regions;
(1) is of the firm opinion that future enlargement of the EC should neither be
allowed to slow down the development of democratic structures and
efficient decision-making processes in the Community not" to endanger the
ul timate goals .of the Union.
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